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introduction 
The criminal justice system is broken. Its policies and policing practices 
flood courtrooms in urban environments with too many cases to handle given 
available resources. Many are cases involving indigent individuals of color ac-
cused of nonviolent offenses. Scholars like Sasha Natapoff, Jenny Roberts, and 
Issa Kohler-Hausmann are bringing much needed attention to this serious is-
sue, focusing primarily on misdemeanor adjudications.
1
 
In a groundbreaking new book, Crook County: Racism and Injustice in Amer-
ica’s Largest Criminal Court, Professor Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve
2
 adds an im-
portant, novel dimension to this problem. She exposes the deeply flawed oper-
ation of the criminal justice system by focusing on how felonies are processed 
in Cook County, Illinois. Her disturbing ethnography of the Cook County-
Chicago criminal courts, the largest unified criminal court system in the United 
States,
3
 is based upon 104 in-depth interviews with judges, prosecutors, public 
defenders, and private attorneys; her own experiences clerking for both the 
Cook County District Attorney’s Office and the Cook County Public Defender’s 
Office; and one thousand hours of felony courtroom observations conducted 
by 130 court watchers.
4
 This mix of perspectives, all of which focus on the court 
professionals “whose actions define the experience and appearance of justice,”
5
 
provides a chilling account of how racialized justice is practiced in the Cook 
County criminal justice system, despite the existence of due process protections 
and a court record. By “turn[ing] the lens on those in power as they do the 
marginalizing,”
6
 Van Cleve reveals how judges, defense lawyers, and prosecu-
tors transform race-neutral due process protections into the tools of racial pun-
ishment. 
 
1. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
639-53 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny 
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011). 
2. Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve is an Assistant Professor at Temple University in the Department 
of Criminal Justice with courtesy appointments in the Department of Sociology and the 
Beasley School of Law. She is a recipient of the 2014-2015 Ford Foundation Fellowship Post-
doctoral Award and was a Visiting Scholar at the American Bar Foundation. 
3. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARG-
EST CRIMINAL COURT xii (2016). 
4. Id. at xiii, 6-7, 9-10, 54. 
5. Id. at xiii. 
6. Id. 
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An important theme of Van Cleve’s book is that the racism practiced in the 
Cook County courts is not “more enigmatic than the overt racism of the past.”
7
 
Rather, it is equally “pervasive, direct, and violent.”
8
 To substantiate this point, 
she exposes deeply problematic and explicitly racist practices that courtroom 
actors engage in, despite holding seemingly contradictory perspectives. This is 
one of the more compelling aspects of her book, since it is unusual to encounter 
such blatant racism on display in this ostensibly colorblind and post-racial era. 
She explains how these actors “claim their behavior as ‘colorblind’ through 
coded language, mimic fairness through due process procedures, and rational-
ize abuse based on morality—all while achieving the experience of segregation 
and de facto racism.”
9
 
In this Review, I complicate the theory of racism underlying Van Cleve’s 
ethnography. Although she never states this explicitly, her theory rests on the 
assumption that racial bias is visible and conscious, even if expressed in ways 
that mask its presence. This is demonstrated not only by the examples she uses, 
but also by the book’s conclusion, which encourages readers to go to court to 
observe the racist practices she describes and thus shame courtroom actors into 
changing them. 
However, I argue that the problem of racial bias is not so limited. Rather, 
research from the past several decades reveals that implicit racial biases can in-
fluence the behaviors and judgments of even the most consciously egalitarian 
individuals in ways of which they are unaware and thus unable to control. Ad-
ditionally, the effects of implicit biases may not be open and obvious. Im-
portantly, then, the absence of discernible racism does not signal the absence of 
racial bias. Furthermore, since it is not possible to detect the influence of im-
plicit biases on decision making simply through observations and interviews, it 
is difficult to ferret out and even more difficult to address. Yet, the absence of 
overtly racist practices does not make the problem of racial bias any less con-
cerning. 
Despite the fact that implicit biases operate in the shadows, I argue that 
there is strong reason to suspect that they will influence the judgments of 
courtroom actors in Cook County, even after blatantly racist practices disap-
pear. This is because criminal courthouses in jurisdictions across the country, 
including those in Cook County, are bearing the brunt of “tough on crime” pol-
icies and policing practices that disproportionately target enforcement of non-
violent and quality of life offenses in indigent, urban, and minority communi-
 
7. Id. at 11. 
8. Id. at 9. 
9. Id. at 186. 
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ties. These policies and practices burden the system with more cases than it has 
the capacity to handle, resulting in what I refer to as systemic triage. 
Triage denotes the process of determining how to allocate scarce resources. 
In the criminal justice context, scholars typically use the term triage to describe 
how public defenders attempt to distribute zealous advocacy amongst their cli-
ents because crushing caseloads limit their ability to zealously represent them 
all.
10
 In this Review, I build upon my prior work examining public defender 
triage
11
 and use the phrase systemic triage to highlight that all criminal justice 
system players are impacted by such expansive criminal justice policies and po-
licing practices—not only public defenders, but also the entire cadre of court-
room players, including prosecutors and judges. 
I argue that under conditions of systemic triage, implicit racial biases are 
likely to thrive. First, these criminal justice policies and policing practices will 
strengthen the already ubiquitous association between subordinated groups 
and crime by filling courtrooms with overwhelming numbers of people of col-
or. Second, implicit biases flourish in situations where individuals make deci-
sions quickly and on the basis of limited information, exactly the circumstances 
that exist under systemic triage. In sum, the problem of racial bias will likely 
persist under conditions of systemic triage, even when it is not accompanied by 
patently racist behaviors. This problem is even more pernicious because its 
subtle nature makes it more challenging to expose and correct. 
This Review proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes and analyzes Van 
Cleve’s ethnographic evidence and conclusions. Importantly, because her ac-
count is primarily qualitative, I cannot quantify the frequency with which the 
problematic practices she identifies occur nor determine how representative her 
examples are. Part II argues that racism in the criminal justice system is more 
problematic and pernicious than even Van Cleve’s account suggests. Relying on 
social science evidence demonstrating the existence of implicit racial biases, I 
argue that these biases can influence the discretionary decisions, perceptions, 
 
10. Other discussions of triage in the criminal justice system tend to focus on public defender 
triage. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from 
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004) (arguing that trial judges face the task of 
rationing public defense services); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representa-
tion, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 475 (2007) (describing “the rise in total number of cases 
requiring appointment of counsel and the inadequacy of indigent defense budgets” (foot-
note omitted)); John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 
1225 (1994) (“[T]his Article suggests the [public] defender’s work is better described by the 
medical/disaster theory of allocation in chaos—triage.”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba 
Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (arguing that 
public defender triage presents a way for implicit racial bias to affect legal outcomes). 
11. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10. 
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and practices of even the most well-meaning individuals in ways that are not 
readily observable. We should be especially concerned about implicit bias in 
courtrooms experiencing systemic triage. Finally, Part III offers some solutions 
to reduce the racialized effects of systemic triage. 
i .  racism in practice 
Van Cleve’s haunting ethnography argues that the existence of “myriad due 
process protections, legal safeguards, and a courtroom record supposedly hold-
ing judges and lawyers accountable”
12
 does little to prevent racism from mani-
festing in the criminal courtrooms of Cook County. Rather, her work reveals 
how these courts are “transformed from central sites of due process into central 
sites of racialized punishment.”
13
 This punishment takes multiple forms, in-
cluding treating people of color as criminals
 
even when they are members of 
the public appearing in court as jurors, witnesses, or researchers;
14
 ridiculing 
defendants with stereotypically black-sounding names;
15
 mocking the speech 
patterns of black defendants by employing a bastardized version of Ebonics;
16
 
using lynching language during plea negotiations;
17
 and subjecting people of 
color to degrading and humiliating treatment.
18
 Van Cleve argues that court-
room actors also routinely punish defendants of color for attempting to exer-
cise their due process rights. 
Evidence from her ethnography reveals that judges, prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and sheriff ’s deputies engaged in these racialized practices. Even more 
disturbingly, bad racial actors were not the only ones to treat people of color 
more harshly.
19
 Van Cleve’s ethnography would be slightly less chilling if this 
were the case because then one could take some comfort knowing that the 
problems would disappear once all the bad apples were removed from the sys-
tem. However, Van Cleve’s observations foreclose this simplistic account. Ra-
ther, she includes examples of even well-meaning judges, prosecutors, and de-
fense lawyers participating in and sustaining this system of racial punishment. 
 
12. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at xi. 
13. Id. at 11. 
14. See generally id. ch. 1 (describing the various forms of racialized punishment in Cook Coun-
ty). 
15. Id. at 60-61. 
16. Id. at 43. 
17. Id. at 108. 
18. See, e.g., id. at 59-65. 
19. Id. at 6. 
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The obvious question is how can actors who “subscribe to the principles of 
due process, . . . learn ethical standards in law school[,] . . . speak in sympa-
thetic ways about justice, fairness, colorblindness, and even identify bias in the 
system,” engage in and rationalize their racialized practices?
20
 As I discuss in 
Section I.A, Van Cleve argues that racism in the courts is accomplished through 
a process of acculturation that begins at the courthouse doors with sheriff ’s 
deputies enforcing racial boundaries. In Section I.B, I present Van Cleve’s as-
sessment of how this racialized culture is maintained through the aggressive 
policing and harsh treatment of anyone, including courtroom actors, who fails 
to observe its practices.
21
 I also describe Van Cleve’s explanation for how judg-
es, prosecutors, and defense attorneys rationalize their racist behaviors by di-
vorcing their perspectives from their practices or “duties” within the system. It 
is in this way, she argues, that they deflect blame, assuage their guilt, and abdi-
cate responsibility for their role in maintaining the system of racialized pun-
ishment. Finally, Section I.C explores some limitations of her powerful and dis-
turbing account. 
A. Policing Racial Boundaries 
Van Cleve suggests that the “double system of justice”
22
 that exists in Cook 
County begins as defendants, family members, jurors, and witnesses arrive at 
the courthouse during the morning “rush hour.” She argues that armed sher-
iff ’s deputies, who are the first institutional players the public encounters, 
begin the process of teaching people of color that they are second-class citizens 
within this space.
23
 To support this point, she shares accounts of court watch-
ers who observed deputies single out people of color for racial mockery and 
disrespect, making white court watchers acutely aware of their white privi-
lege.
24
 She explains that some white court watchers, no matter how they were 
dressed, reported being asked why they were there and whether they were law-
yers or students, while some black court watchers “were mistaken for defend-
ants and treated like criminals.”
25
 
She also provides anecdotes of sheriff ’s deputies continuing to police racial 
boundaries in the courtrooms by subjecting people of color to hostile and dis-
 
20. Id. at 133. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 16. 
23. Id. at 22-28. 
24. Id. at 25-26. 
25. Id. at 25, 41-42. 
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respectful treatment for actions as simple—and reasonable—as daring to ask 
questions. When Van Cleve was a clerk in the prosecutor’s office, she observed 
an incident that occurred when an elderly black woman attempted to ascertain 
where her son’s case would be heard. The deputy “tore the woman up with in-
sults” and finally stated to a prosecutor walking into the courtroom, “Tell her: 
‘Your son is executed.’”
26
 In contrast, Van Cleve also observed the different 
treatment of an older, gray-haired white woman—wearing a diamond wedding 
ring and sporting “perfectly coiffed” hair and “manicured and pristine” nails—
who crossed the barrier separating the gallery from the courtroom to talk to the 
court clerk. This woman “was able to finish her question, was answered re-
spectfully, and then the sheriff kindly told her to sit down—acting more like an 
usher than the abuser who had been barking at the public all afternoon.”
27
 
These are just a few of the disturbing examples of sheriff ’s deputies demeaning 
people of color while treating the few privileged whites who appeared in the 
courthouse differently. 
Van Cleve’s book does not share a single story in which courtroom actors 
chastised deputies for the hostility and aggressiveness they heaped on people of 
color. Instead, she argues that courtroom actors were socialized within the 
courthouse culture to avoid commenting on racial abuse and racial divides.
28
 
This is discussed next. 
B. Culture and the Race-Blind Code 
Sheriff ’s deputies were not the only courtroom actors to engage in racist 
behaviors. Van Cleve shares anecdotes of judges, prosecutors, and defense law-
yers helping to create and sustain a system of racial punishment. Based on her 
ethnographic evidence, she explains that courtroom professionals learn to code 
race out of the picture by conflating criminality, morality, and race. This is done 
primarily by labeling certain defendants as “mopes,” a construct that implies 
immorality.
29
 The term is used by courtroom actors to refer to “someone who is 
uneducated, incompetent, degenerate, and lazy.”
30





26. Id. at 35-36. 
27. Id. at 66. 
28. Id. at 32-35. 
29. Id. at 57-61. 
30. Id. at 61. 
31. Id. 
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Defendants who were labeled mopes were typically charged with nonvio-
lent offenses, such as possession of drugs and shoplifting, that “imply social 
dysfunction rather than criminal risk.”
32
 Because these defendants were over-
whelmingly black and brown, “the moral rubric applied to defendants by 
courtroom professionals” was racially inscribed.
33
 As such, the “‘immorality’ of 
defendants . . . is both a criminal distinction and a racial one . . . .”
34
 Van Cleve 
argues that by using this colorblind logic, courtroom professionals convinced 
themselves that the “disdain” they showed to people of color was “not based 
upon the color of their skin but upon the moral violations they embody.”
35
 She 
concludes that this “race-blind” code “allow[ed] racism to exist in the court-
house space without professionals being ‘racists.’”
36
 
Defendants labeled as mopes received “due process for the undeserving.”
37
 
This entailed “(1) the streamlining of scripted due process requirements, (2) 
the curtailing of due process through informal sanctions that are often not part 
of the court record, and (3) the absolute exclusion of mopes from participation 
in the legal process—even in cursory ways mandated by law.”
38 
Van Cleve 
shares stories of courtroom actors punishing those labeled as mopes for at-
tempting to exercise their due process rights. In one disturbing example, Van 
Cleve overheard a sheriff ’s deputy bragging to prosecutors about wrapping an 
electrical cord around a defendant’s seat, plugging it into the wall to feign an 
electric chair, and saying, “OK, you’re all plugged in and ready to go.”
39
 This 
was done simply because the defendant had asked for a jury trial.
40
 Prosecutors 
“laughed, and never questioned the legal ethics of such a practical joke.”
41
 
White defendants, she argues, were generally not subjected to the same treat-
ment,
42





32. Id. at 115. 
33. Id. at 58. 
34. Id. at 53. 
35. Id. at 60. 
36. Id. at 68-69. 
37. Id. at 73. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 63. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 65-69. 
43. Id. at 68. 
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One of the most important aspects of Van Cleve’s ethnography is her expla-
nation for how racism becomes entrenched in institutional culture such that it 
persists regardless of “the racial identity and political leaning of any one person 
at the helm.”
44
 For instance, some prosecutors expressed serious misgivings 
about the way the system treated criminal defendants, and some of them also 
viewed drug laws as draconian.
45
 Ironically, one prosecutor even critiqued the 
“factory mill” practices of the system, which was only concerned with dispos-
ing of cases as quickly as possible.
46
 Yet, based on their statements during in-
terviews, Van Cleve concludes that prosecutors learned to rationalize their ra-
cialized behaviors by separating their perspectives from their practices.
47
 They 
viewed their practice of law as a “duty” that did not necessarily reflect their ac-
tual beliefs.
48 Additionally, she found that prosecutors justified the curtailment 
of due process rights by convincing themselves that spending time on cases in-
volving mopes “literally obstructs ‘real justice’”
49
 by taking resources away 
from the important cases involving serious crimes with actual victims.
50
 Their 
incentive was to resolve their cases as quickly as possible because due process 
for mopes, in the words of one prosecutor, was “a waste.”
51
 
Similarly, defense lawyers were sympathetic to “the plight of defendants,” 
“provide[d] critiques about substantive justice and the abuse of defendants by 
prosecutors and judges,”
52
 and commented on the “obvious racial disparities 
and divisions in the ways prosecutors and judges treated their indigent cli-
ents.”
53
 Yet, they too engaged in racialized practices. This occurred because de-
fense lawyers learned that “[t]here were dire consequences for fighting too 
hard, pursuing ‘too many’ motions and trials, or pushing due process necessi-
ties beyond the absolute minimum.”
54
 Defense attorneys who engaged in vig-
orous and zealous advocacy often “were labeled ‘clueless,’ ‘difficult,’ ‘incompe-
 
44. Id. at 133. 
45. Id. at 13-16, 138. 
46. Id. at 138. 
47. Id. at 133. 
48. Id. at 135, 137. 
49. Id. at 73. 
50. Id. at 71-73. 
51. Id. at 73. 
52. Id. at 180. 
53. Id. at 97. Private attorney responses were more mixed, with about half expressing that bias 
existed and the other half expressing that it did not. Id. at 97-98. 
54. Id. at 83. 
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tent,’ or worse: ‘mopes,’”
55
 and were humiliated and punished in ways that 
were not reflected in the court record.
56
 For example, one attorney was locked 
up with her client.
57
 Additionally, the clients of defense attorneys who engaged 
in zealous advocacy were sometimes punished with harsher treatment.
58
 
As a result of this socialization, one defense lawyer explained that he had to 
carefully weigh how much capital he expended on a client because capital was 
“finite and scarce.”
59
 He had to “determine whether a defendant [wa]s worth 
the fight”
60
 by separating those who were “native” to the system from the “tiny 
subset of outliers” who deserved zealous advocacy.
61
 He deflected personal re-
sponsibility for the problematic choices he made, saying that “these are the 
sorts of decisions you find yourself having to make as a practical matter because 
that’s the system that exists and [it’s] bigger than you.”
62
 
In sum, Van Cleve’s book explains how criminal justice system profession-
als dispense, legitimize, and defend racialized justice. She argues, “Colorblind 
racism is more than just a ‘doing’ of rhetoric; it is a type of complicated habitus 
that informs institutional practices and cultural memberships, and even aids in 
the organizational efficiency of the criminal courts . . . . [This is] how profes-
sionals . . . ‘do racism’ while ‘doing justice.’”
63
 Her own efforts to fit into the 
system and maintain her privileged access within it powerfully underscores the 
importance of entrenched institutional culture to sustaining racial disad-
vantage.
64
 She describes her time embedded in the Cook County criminal jus-
tice system as “an indoctrination: the prosecutors, judges, and defense attor-
neys took me under their wings. It was through this process that I learned the 
rules of the racialized court system—rules that included both how to process 






56. Id. at 83, 103. 
57. Id. at 85. 
58. Id. at 84. 
59. Id. at 159. 
60. Id. at 160. 
61. Id. at 160-61. 
62. Id. at 161. 
63. Id. at 53. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 8, 9, 61. 
65. Id. at 8. 




Van Cleve’s account of how racism is practiced in the era of colorblindness 
is important and compelling. However, it is limited by a number of features 
typical of ethnographies. First, her observations are not necessarily generaliza-
ble to jurisdictions beyond Cook County.
66
 Second, the absence of quantitative 
evidence makes it difficult to determine how frequent, representative, and per-
vasive the overtly racialized practices she exposes are.
67
 Including some expla-
nation of how she coded her data and how she determined which stories to in-
clude and exclude, as well as sharing the complexity of her evidence by 
discussing cases that did not fit neatly into her theory, could have helped ad-
dress some of these problems and allowed readers to more readily evaluate her 
claims. 
However, despite these limitations, there are reasons to believe that her 
qualitative accounts are representative of the culture of the Cook County crimi-
nal courts. Her ethnographic evidence is the result of nine months of observa-
tions collected over the course of seven years (1997-2004);
68
 interviews she 
conducted during the same period; 104 interviews conducted by others in 
2006;
69
 and data collected by 130 court watchers from 2008-09.
70
 Thus, her da-
ta “incorporate[] multiple vantage points on the same site”
71
 and span over 
twelve years. Furthermore, the observations remain consistent over this period 
of time. All of this provides support for the pervasiveness of the practices she 
recounts and lends some external reliability to her findings.
72
 Additionally, the 
 
66. John D. Brewer, The Ethnographic Critique of Ethnography: Sectarianism in the FUC, 28 SOC. 
231, 233 (1994) (“Ethnography falls short because findings cannot be generalised; and when 
ethnographers make claims about empirical generalisation they often fail to establish that 
the setting is typical of the larger population to which the data are thought to be relevant.”). 
67. In one instance, she does provide some quantitative data to support her powerful qualitative 
account. For instance, when discussing whether defense lawyers believed that defendants 
were treated fairly regardless of race or class, she included two tables providing the percent-
age of attorneys who answered the question in the affirmative, in the negative, or failed to 
answer the question at all. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 97. However, no similar empirical ev-
idence was provided for any of her other claims. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 197. 
70. Id. She explains that she used this multifaceted approach because in an era where people 
avoid expressing negative racial attitudes, it is difficult to measure the influence of race using 
a single method. Id. at 195-96. 
71. Id. at 196. 
72. See Margaret D. LeCompte & Judith Preissle Goetz, Problems of Reliability and Validity in 
Ethnographic Research, 52 REV. EDUC. RES. 31, 32 (1982) (“External reliability addresses the 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916833
the yale law journal 126:864  2017 
874 
lack of quantitative evidence is not a reason to dismiss her compelling conclu-
sions. As one of the great ethnographers, Howard Becker, once observed in a 
classic article, qualitative methods “do not lend themselves to . . . ready sum-
mary”
73
 and “frequently consist of many different kinds of observations which 




Overall, the importance of Van Cleve’s ethnography is its exposure of how 
some courtroom professionals in Cook County practice and rationalize racism 
in the era of colorblindness. She explains how racism thrives despite constitu-
tional safeguards and courtroom actors who are well versed in ethics and who 
often hold perspectives that are consistent with notions of fairness, equality, 
and justice.
75
 Van Cleve’s account of racism in the Cook County criminal courts 
is concerning and important to expose even if it is difficult to determine how 
pervasive these overtly racialized practices are. 
In Part II, my goal is to supplement Van Cleve’s account of how racial bias 
operates. Van Cleve concludes that the practice of racism in Cook County is vir-
tually indistinguishable from the racist practices of the Jim Crow era.
76
 In sup-
port of this theory, she only shares examples of courtroom actors engaging in 
overtly problematic racialized practices in cases involving individuals labeled as 
mopes.
77
 By restricting her examples, her account leaves the impression that 
the problem of racism in Cook County is limited to that which is overt, explicit, 
and conscious. However, in Part II, I argue that racism in the criminal justice 
system is even more problematic. Relying on social science evidence demon-
strating the existence of implicit racial biases, I contend that explicitly racist 
practices are not the only form of racism about which we should be concerned. 
 
issue of whether independent researchers would discover the same phenomena or generate 
the same constructs in the same or similar settings.”). 
73. Howard S. Becker, Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation, 23 AM. SOC. REV. 
652, 659-60 (1958). 
74. Id.; see also ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 7-9 (1968) (explaining that the author did not gath-
er statistical evidence because a good way to learn about any social world is to obtain ethno-
graphic detail instead). 
75. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 11-13. 
76. See id. at 186. 
77. The only instance she offers of normative professionalism involved a defense lawyer who 
was not part of any particular courtroom workgroup. According to Van Cleve, this lawyer’s 
outsider status protected her from the culture of the Cook County courts. Id. at 77-78. Van 
Cleve does not explain why she provides no accounts of courtroom actors engaging in posi-
tive interactions with those labeled mopes. The reader is thus left wondering whether these 
examples existed but she chose not to include them, or whether she and others simply did 
not observe professional conduct in cases involving mopes. 
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Rather, implicit racial bias can also influence the discretionary decisions, per-
ceptions, and practices of even the most well-meaning individuals in ways that 
are not readily observable. Thus, my theory of racism is broader than one that 
focuses solely on the overt racism Van Cleve exposes. While her account of ex-
plicitly racist conduct is deeply troubling, I argue that the problem of implicit 
racism is even more pernicious. 
i i .  systemic triage and its racialized consequences 
Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers in many criminal courtrooms 
across the country are laboring under the weight of far too many cases to give 
each one individualized treatment. This has systemic consequences as these 
professionals struggle to quickly sort defendants into those who are deserving 
of time and attention and those who are not, a process I describe as systemic 
triage. As I will explain, racialized justice is a foreseeable consequence of sys-
temic triage because of the influence of implicit, i.e. unconscious, racial biases 
on behaviors, perceptions, and judgments. Section II.A summarizes the well-
established social science research on implicit racial biases. Section II.B sets 
forth my theory of systemic triage. Finally, Section II.C argues that under con-
ditions of systemic triage, even well-meaning, consciously egalitarian actors 
will likely engage in practices that sustain significant and problematic racial 
disparities. 
A. Implicit Racial Bias 
Research demonstrates that many of our decisions result from mental pro-
cesses that occur without our conscious awareness, intent, and control.
78
 These 
processes help us to cope with all the information that confronts us by making 
quick, automatic, and unconscious associations in response to a stimulus.
79
 For 
instance, we might automatically and unconsciously associate “nurse” with 
 
78. See John A. Bargh, The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and 
Control in Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & 
Thomas K. Srull eds., Psychology Press 2014) (1994). 
79. Id. at 31 (stating that automatic processes “enable[] a reduction of the massive amount of 
stimulation and information bombarding one at any given moment into a more manageable 
subset of important objects, events, and appraisals”); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, 
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 
485 (2004) (“[T]he view of stereotypes as largely unconscious is consistent with social cog-
nition research on the cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that perceivers must employ to man-
age the vast amount of social information with which they must deal.” (citation omitted)). 
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“compassion” and “hospital.” These unconscious associations can influence our 
perceptions, judgments, and behaviors without our conscious intent. 
Implicit racial biases refer to the unconscious stereotypes and attitudes that 
we associate with racial groups.
80
 These biases are pervasive and can influence 
real world behaviors. For instance, a meta-analysis of 122 implicit bias studies 




There is copious evidence that individuals of all races have implicit racial 
biases linking blacks with criminality
82
 and whites with innocence. In a recent 
article, Professors Robert Smith, Justin Levinson, and Zoë Robinson coined the 
phrase “implicit white favoritism” to distinguish it from unconsciously nega-
tive racial attitudes and beliefs toward people of color.
83
 They define implicit 
white favoritism as “the automatic association of positive stereotypes and atti-
tudes with members of a favored group, leading to preferential treatment for 
persons of that group.”
84 
Their analysis of existing studies reveals that white 
men are unconsciously “disassociated with violence” and associated with posi-
tive, law-abiding behavior.
85
 Implicit racial biases are activated by cues present 
in the environment such as skin color.
86
 Once activated, they can influence the 
 
80. The scholarship on implicit racial bias is vast. For a summary of the literature on implicit 
racial bias, particularly as it relates to the criminal justice system, see Jerry Kang et al., Im-
plicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); and L. Song Richardson, Arrest 
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011). 
81. Anthony G. Greenwald et al. , Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association Test Can 
Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553, 558 (2015). 
82. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as vio-
lent and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for almost 60 years.” (cita-
tions omitted)); Graham & Lowery, supra note 79, at 485 (describing the “pernicious belief” 
that African American youth are “violent, aggressive, dangerous, and possess adult-like 
criminal intent”); Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective 
Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008) (“There is overwhelming ev-
idence that young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and dangerous.”). 
83. See Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoë Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the 
Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 873 (2015). 
84. Id. at 874-75 (footnote omitted). 
85. Id. at 898 (emphasis added). 
86. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereo-
type Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 241-42 (1996). Bargh 
writes, “To the extent that an individual repeatedly has the same reaction to a social stimulus 
event, the representation of that response should come eventually to be activated automati-
cally on the mere occurrence of that event.” Id. at 231. 
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behaviors and judgments of even the most egalitarian individuals in ways that 
sustain problematic and unwarranted racial disparities.
87
 
The influence of implicit biases on behaviors and judgments is not inevita-
ble, however. Rather, certain environments are more conducive to their opera-
tion than others. Implicit biases flourish in situations where information and 
time are limited, decision makers are mentally drained and distracted, and deci-
sion making is highly discretionary.
88
 As I will discuss next, these conditions 
exist under systemic triage. 
B. Systemic Triage 
Under an ideal model of criminal justice, courtroom professionals would 
have sufficient resources to give time and attention to every case. However, to-
day’s criminal justice system operates very differently. In large urban environ-
ments like Cook County, public defenders, prosecutors, and judges are inun-
dated with far more cases involving nonviolent offenses than they are equipped 
to handle. This makes it difficult to give each individual accused of misconduct 
the care and consideration he or she deserves and is constitutionally entitled to 
receive.
89
 For instance, public defenders in Rhode Island each handle more 
than 1,700 cases per year, on average. The equivalent figures for individual 




87. See generally Greenwald et al., supra note 81, at 553 (describing how small, implicit biases can 
have a societally significant impact either by influencing many people in small ways or by 
repeatedly affecting individuals); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the 
Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 17 (2009) (describing implicit racial bias studies). For a summary of critiques of 
the implicit association test and responses to those critiques, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
“Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, 
and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 41-45 (2014). 
88. See infra Section II.C. 
89. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1043, 1043 (2013) (noting the pressure to treat people as groups rather than as individuals, 
which “is in deep tension with core precepts of criminal law, most fundamentally the idea 
that criminal guilt is an individuated concept reflecting the defendant’s personal culpabil-
ity”); Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1317-18; Lisa C. Wood et al., Meet-and-Plead: The Inevitable 
Consequence of Crushing Defender Workloads, 42 LITIG. 20, 26 (2016) (noting that “the prob-
lem of excessive workloads is systemic” and that “[f]or years, tough-on-crime policies, 
mandatory minimum sentences, collateral consequences, and broken-windows policing 
pushed workloads ever higher”); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 1, at 639 (describing 
the large increase in the number of misdemeanor arrests in New York City from 1980 to 
2011). 
90. Wood et al., supra note 89, at 20, 22. 
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cent article reports that “in upstate New York, one attorney represented over 
2,200 clients; and in Illinois, a public defender handled 4,000 cases during the 
course of a year.”
91
 These excessive caseloads impact defense lawyers, prosecu-
tors, and judges alike,
92
 creating pressure on each of these courtroom actors to 
engage in triage—the process of allocating scarce resources. 
Typically, analysis of triage within the criminal justice system is focused on 
public defender offices. Scholars have discussed how public defenders attempt 
to distribute zealous advocacy amongst their clients since crushing caseloads 
prevent them from providing it fully to all clients.
93
 As Phillip Atiba Goff and I 
previously observed, 
[T]he provision of indigent defense is often likened to medical triage. 
Similar to hospital emergency rooms, [public defender] offices face 
demands that far outpace their resources. In order to save time to de-
fend the cases that they find deserving, attorneys may plead out other 
cases quickly or go to trial unprepared. This reality means that for most 
[public defenders], the question is not “how do I engage in zealous and 
effective advocacy,” but rather, “given that all my clients deserve aggres-
sive advocacy, how do I choose among them?”
94
 
Despite this robust discussion of public defender triage, however, little at-
tention has been paid to the fact that judges and prosecutors also face intense 
pressure to quickly determine which cases can be resolved with little time and 
effort and which cases require or deserve the individualized attention associated 
with due process. I refer to this situation of pressurized decision making by all 
courtroom actors as systemic triage. 
Systemic triage primarily results from criminal justice system policies and 




91. Id. at 20. 
92. Id. at 21 (citing Honorable Sean C. Gallagher, A Judge’s Comments, 42 LITIG. 21 (2016)). 
93. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10; Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Le-
gal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1180-81 (2003); Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1224-25; 
Richardson & Goff, supra note 10; see also Hashimoto, supra note 10, at 475 (“Lawyers carry-
ing caseloads that far exceed national standards cannot adequately consult with their clients 
or provide sufficient investigation.”). 
94. Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 2632. 
95. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS 184 (2010) (arguing that “the War on Drugs is the engine of mass incarcera-
tion”); Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial Disparities in Drug Arrests, 
32 JUST. Q. 288, 309 (2015) (finding that “the policies pursued under the War on Drugs dis-
proportionately held African-Americans accountable for their transgressions”); see also 
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that overwhelm courtroom professionals with more cases involving nonviolent 
offenders than they have the capacity to handle. This creates pressure on these 
actors to develop shortcuts for determining who deserves due process and who 
does not. For instance, under conditions of systemic triage, prosecutors will 
not have time, in every case, to interview victims and witnesses, and to make 
careful and considered judgments about how to exercise their enormous discre-
tion according to their ethical mandate as ministers of justice.
96
 Similarly, ra-
ther than providing effective and zealous advocacy to each of their clients by 
conducting investigations,
97





 researching the law, preparing for trials, negotiating 
pleas, and otherwise engaging in vigorous advocacy,
100
 defense lawyers instead 
will find ways to quickly determine when these time-consuming activities are 
necessary. Finally, judges will be constrained in their ability to carefully consid-
 
Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons 
from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419 (2005) (noting the huge impact of the War on Drugs on 
blacks); M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” 
Policing As a Form of Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 
393-95 (2011) (recounting the War on Drugs’ effect on blacks living in New York); K. Babe 
Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance 
Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276-80 (2009) (critiquing broken windows 
policing); Natapoff, supra note 89, 1063-66 (noting that police focus arrests on young men 
of color); Al Baker, New York Minorities More Likely To Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES (May  
13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk.html [http://perma.cc
/79DV-GPVM]; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 
11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html [http://perma.cc
/NKK6-6QZZ]. Some scholars, such as Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, conclude that bro-
ken-windows policing “is not about disorderly places, nor about improving the quality of 
life, but about policing poor people in poor places.” Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street 
Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
457, 457 (2000). See generally George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The 
Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [http://perma.cc/YBP7-VJSS] (dis-
cussing broken windows policing). 
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
97. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
ABA § 4-4.1 (4th ed. 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice
/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition.html [http://perma.cc/9F26-DG3X]. 
98. Id. §§ 4-3.1, 4-3.3, 4-3.9, 4-5.1. 
99. Id. §§ 4-5.2, 4-7.11, 4-8.1. 
100. Id. § 4-4.6 (discussing counsel’s obligation to research the law); id. §§ 4-6.1 to -6.3 (discuss-
ing counsel’s obligation to negotiate). These ethical obligations apply regardless of the law-
yer’s workload, see id. § 4-4.1(a) (“Defense counsel has a duty to investigate in all cases, and 
to determine whether there is a sufficient factual basis for criminal charges.”), and whether 
or not defendants want to plead guilty, id. §§ 4-4.1(b), 4-6.1(b). 
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er motions, ensure that defendants understand their rights, and make individ-
ualized sentencing decisions after careful review of the evidence.
101
 
However, the concept of systemic triage does not simply consider the triage 
decisions of individual public defenders, prosecutors, and judges in isolation. 
Rather, it highlights the symbiotic nature of triage decision making, attending 
to how the resource allocation decisions of an actor in one institution, such as 
the prosecutor, influences the workload of actors in the other institutions, i.e. 
public defenders and judges. For instance, a defense lawyer’s decision to take a 
case to trial does not simply increase her workload; it also has consequences for 
prosecutors and judges. As a result of the defense lawyer’s decision, the prose-
cutor will have to devote time and resources to tasks such as becoming familiar 
with the evidence and responding to motions. Similarly, judges will have to 
dedicate time to reviewing pleadings, issuing rulings, and overseeing jury se-
lection, to name a few of the tasks associated with trials. 
Systemic triage pays attention to this interdependent relationship amongst 
institutional actors. It highlights the fact that while the pressure created by sys-
temic triage comes chiefly from the overwhelming number of cases that flood 
the system, it also stems from the resource allocation decisions of all actors 
within the system. Thus, each individual actor, i.e. each prosecutor, defense 
lawyer, and judge, has a vested interest in overseeing how the others exercise 
their discretion. 
For this reason, attending solely to the triage decisions of one individual in-
stitutional actor, such as the prosecutor, is insufficient to understand the sys-
temic effects of triage. Rather, each institutional actor will police the resource 
allocation decisions of the others. The policing of decisions across institutions 
can create a racialized culture if resource allocation decisions typically favor in-
dividuals of one race over another. For instance, courtroom actors will punish 
the decision to grant due process rights to an individual who they conclude is 
undeserving. As I discuss next, the decision that an individual is undeserving is 
more likely to occur when that individual is a person of color, due to implicit 
racial bias. Hence, under conditions of systemic triage, a culture of decision 
making within a courthouse that sustains racially biased decision making is 
predictable. 
 
101. See infra note 144 and accompanying text for an example of a judge in Cook County engag-
ing in triage behaviors. 
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C. Implicit Bias Under Conditions of Systemic Triage 
I theorize that racialized justice is the foreseeable consequence of systemic 
triage, regardless of the conscious racial motives of judges, prosecutors, and 
criminal defense lawyers, and even in the absence of overtly racist practices. 
That is because implicit racial biases are likely to impact decision making under 
conditions of systemic triage for a number of reasons. First, the proactive polic-
ing practices that create the conditions leading to systemic triage also result in 
the disproportionate representation of people of color in criminal courtrooms. 
Filling criminal courtrooms with overwhelming numbers of people of color 
will likely strengthen the already ubiquitous conscious and unconscious associ-
ation linking people of color with crime and whites with innocence because 
simply rehearsing associations strengthens them.
102
 Strengthening these asso-
ciations can occur even if many of the cases are dismissed
103
 and even if judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers understand on an intellectual level that this 
disproportionate representation is the predictable result of focusing law en-
forcement efforts on communities of color. 
Second, under conditions of systemic triage, prosecutors and defense law-
yers are likely anxious and distracted by all of the tasks simultaneously pulling 
at their attention, such as listening to the judge, negotiating with opposing 
counsel, quickly reviewing case files, thinking about what they will say when 
their cases are called, and answering questions from clients or witnesses. This 
multitasking can cause cognitive depletion, which is one of the classic situa-




102. These negative associations are not just practiced in the courthouse, but within offices too. 
For instance, in Cook County, Van Cleve shares how the Gang Unit of the State’s Attorney’s 
Office wallpapers its office with mug shots of black and Latino defendants. VAN CLEVE, supra 
note 3, at 1. 
103. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 1, at 642-43 (noting that many misdemeanor offenses in New 
York City are dismissed). 
104. See Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application 
of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991) (finding that once 
stereotype activation occurred, cognitive “busyness” increased the application of stereo-
types); Olesya Govorun & B. Keith Payne, Ego-Depletion and Prejudice: Separating Automatic 
and Controlled Components, 24 SOC. COGNITION 111, 111-12 (2006) (discussing cognitive de-
pletion); Graham & Lowery, supra note 79, at 486 (discussing the impact of information 
deficits); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, 
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 18 (reviewing researchers’ finding that 
“time pressure on a judgment task (thereby reducing attentional resources available for the 
task) increased the level of ethnic stereotyping in subjects’ judgments”); Jennifer A. Riche-
son & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs, Consequences, and Possibili-
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Additionally, because courtroom actors handle large numbers of cases, they 
will feel compelled to make quick decisions in the face of enormous infor-
mation deficits about which cases can be disposed of quickly and which cases 
are worthy of time and effort. For instance, prosecutors may offer plea bargains 
and pressure defense lawyers into convincing their clients to accept them de-
spite the fact that neither actor had the time to thoroughly investigate the case 
and interview all the potential witnesses.
105
 Implicit biases are more likely to 
influence judgments when individuals make discretionary decisions quickly, 
based upon incomplete information.
106
 
Implicit racial biases can affect decision making in ways that create and sus-
tain problematic racial disparities. For instance, these biases can cause people to 
interpret ambiguous information in racially disparate ways. In one study 
demonstrating this, mock jurors were asked to evaluate evidence that was am-
biguous as to guilt or innocence.
107
 The results showed that as a result of im-
plicit racial biases, jurors were significantly more likely to conclude that the ev-
idence was probative of guilt when the case involved a dark-skinned 
perpetrator versus a light-skinned perpetrator.
108
 In another study involving an 
assault, mock jurors were more likely to conclude that the defendant was less 
aggressive and “more honest and moral” when he was white as opposed to 
black.
109
 These differences in judgment were correlated with implicit bias. 
Under conditions of systemic triage, it is probable that implicit racial biases 
will cause judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to draw adverse inferences 
from ambiguous facts more readily when defendants are black, especially when 
nonviolent offenses involving drugs are at issue, since young black men are 
 
ties, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318 (2007) (discussing dominant group 
anxiety during interracial interactions). 
105. Van Cleve’s book provides evidence of this type of behavior. See, e.g., VAN CLEVE, supra note 
3, at 122 (discussing her observation that prosecutors rarely read the case files of “mopes”); 
id. at 83-87 (discussing how public defenders are punished for engaging in zealous advoca-
cy). 
106. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 79, at 486 (discussing the impact of information deficits); 
Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 104, at 18 (reviewing researchers’ finding that “time pressure 
on a judgment task (thereby reducing attentional resources available for the task) increased 
the level of ethnic stereotyping in subjects’ judgments”). 
107. Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, 
and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 337 (2010). 
108. Id. at 337-39. 
109. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice 
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 212 
(2001). These differences disappeared when race was made salient. Id. at 212-13. 
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closely associated with drugs in our conscious and unconscious minds.
110
 
Thus, the confluence of a black defendant and a drug charge will likely make it 
cognitively easier to form a judgment that the defendant is guilty and will not 
benefit from more process. Conversely, when the defendant is white, implicit 
white favoritism will likely make judgments of guilt more difficult, resulting in 
the decision that due process will make a difference to the case. 
Furthermore, implicit biases can also influence feelings of empathy. Empa-
thy sensitizes people to injustice
111
 and plays an important role in discretionary 
decision making. In one study, for instance, researchers found that people who 
felt more empathy for white defendants than black defendants would give 
white defendants more lenient sentences, even when everything else about the 
case was identical.
112
 Moreover, social scientists have found that there is a racial 
empathy gap, meaning that empathy for the pain experienced by another does 
not occur or occurs with less intensity when white subjects witness or imagine 
pain inflicted on black individuals.
113
 This empathy gap is related to levels of 
 
110. See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note 82, at 883 (discussing the implicit association of blacks 
with crime); Trawalter et al., supra note 82, at 1322 (“There is overwhelming evidence that 
young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and dangerous.”); Bernd Wittenbrink 
et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815 (2001) (discussing how context influences the activation 
of implicit bias). In prior work, Phillip Atiba Goff and I have referred to this quick judgment 
of criminality as the “suspicion heuristic.” L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-
Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 295 (2012). 
111. See John F. Dovidio et al., Empathy and Intergroup Relations, in PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMO-
TIONS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 393, 399 (Mario Mikulincer & 
Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2010); Matteo Forgiarini et al., Racism and Empathy for Pain on Our 
Skin, 2 FRONTIERS PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1 (2011). 
112. James D. Johnson et al., Rodney King and O.J. Revisited: The Impact of Race and Defendant 
Empathy Induction on Judicial Decisions, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1208, 1215 (2002). Addi-
tionally, the jurors were more likely to attribute the actions of white defendants to the situa-
tion. Id. at 1216. 
113. Studies have found that witnessing or imagining another individual experiencing pain caus-
es our own brains to react as if we were experiencing pain ourselves. Forgiarini et al., supra 
note 111, at 1 (“[E]xperimental data indicate that when people witness or imagine the pain of 
another person, they map the other[’s] pain onto their brain using the same network acti-
vated during firsthand experience of pain, as if they were vicariously experiencing the ob-
served pain.” (citations omitted)). However, in one study, the brains of white individuals 
exhibited less activation when observing pain inflicted on black individuals than on white 
individuals. Id. at 2, 4-6. The study did not involve black subjects. To the extent that this ra-
cial empathy gap works both ways, that is, that black decision makers would show the same 
lack of empathy toward whites experiencing pain, racial disparities would still exist since 
blacks are underrepresented in the legal field. 
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 The more implicit anti-black bias subjects had, the great-




Empathy can cause courtroom actors to take time to ensure that an individ-
ual’s due process rights are protected, to respond with more sympathy and lis-
ten with more care and attention to a defendant’s concerns, and to pay more 
attention to the circumstances of the case. Prosecutors and judges may respond 
more favorably to defense counsel’s arguments concerning mitigating circum-
stances and the hardships their clients might suffer as a result of incarceration. 
Empathy may also result in prosecutors being more willing to offer treatment 
or other rehabilitative options instead of incarceration, and judges being more 
willing to accept these recommendations. Empathy can also influence defense 
lawyers’ decisions about which clients are worthy of zealous advocacy and ex-
pending precious capital. However, because the conditions of systemic triage 
are likely to trigger implicit biases, courtroom actors might feel less empathy 
toward defendants of color. Thus, the benefits of empathy will accrue more to 
whites than blacks, resulting in significant racial disparities even in the absence 
of conscious bias and overtly racist behaviors. In fact, decision makers will be 
completely unaware that unconscious biases influenced their judgments. 
The operation of implicit bias under conditions of systemic triage also ex-
plains how a courtroom culture can develop that routinely denies due process 
to black individuals and others stereotyped as criminal even in the absence of 
the type of overt and consciously biased decision making Van Cleve highlights 
in her book. Cook County is a paradigmatic case of systemic triage. As Van 
Cleve observes, “Cases bombard the system; the average felony prosecutor in 
Cook County has three hundred or more open cases at any one time,”
116
 and in 
2005, each public defender resolved approximately 229 felonies, meaning that 
they likely worked on many more.
117
 In one disturbing demonstration of how 
this pressure played out in perverse ways, Van Cleve describes an instance 
when sheriff ’s deputies “act[ed] as go-betweens to update judges and court-
room workgroups on which court [was] ‘winning.’ One court watcher noted a 
judge screaming, “‘Let’s go! Do something!’ at his colleagues when there was a 




114. Id. at 4. 
115. Id. 
116. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 72. 
117. Id. at 159; see also id. at 28-29, 58 (discussing the extreme time pressure under which defense 
attorneys and prosecutors work). 
118. Id. at 58. 
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Additionally, the association between blacks and crime is well rehearsed in 
Cook County given the disproportionate number of people of color charged 
with nonviolent offenses.
119
 Of the almost ten thousand individuals housed in 
the Cook County jail, approximately 86.3% are black and Latino men charged 
with nonviolent offenses.120 Van Cleve provides evidence of the strong concep-
tual association between blacks and crime that exists in Cook County.
121
 For 
instance, she describes courtroom actors becoming so accustomed to seeing 
black individuals within the courthouse that they become desensitized to the 
racial disparities that shocked them when they first encountered the system.
122
 
The disproportionate representation of blacks in the criminal courthouse be-
comes natural and expected. Thus, even if the system in Cook County evolves 
to such an extent that judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers no longer en-
gage in race-conscious decision making that apportions due process rights 
based on whether or not someone is characterized as a mope,
123
 and even if 
overtly racist practices disappear, it is probable that implicit racial biases will 
continue to influence behaviors in racially problematic ways. 
i i i . recommended remedies 
Consistent with her theme that racism in the Cook County courts is akin to 
Jim Crow racism, Van Cleve ends her book by encouraging readers to go to 
court to observe the racist practices she describes. Doing so, she argues, is “a 
type of activism [that can] lend a conscience to an otherwise unaccountable 
system.”
124
 In Section III.A, I raise questions about the efficacy of her solution, 
and in III.B, I offer alternatives. 
 
119. See id. at 20-21. 
120. Id. at 19 (noting that 67.3% are young black men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty 
years, and Latinos and other people of color constitute nineteen percent); id. at 7 (noting 
that most of the black and Latino defendants appearing in felony court were charged with 
“possession of drugs, theft, intent to sell drugs, or other non-violent offenses”). 
121. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which sheriff ’s deputies 
treated black researchers like criminals). 
122. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 27, 32, 101-02. 
123. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing pricing decisions made by defense 
lawyers). 
124. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 189. 
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A. Problems with Court Watching 
Van Cleve urges readers to help “rectify the . . . racial violence inflicted by 
the courts”
125
 by engaging in court watching. The practice of court watching 
can be a powerful tool to expose the workings of a court system that operates in 
the shadows,
126
 especially if courtroom actors do not realize that court watchers 
are there. Van Cleve’s ethnography is a testament to that. Additionally, if court 
watchers are open and obvious, their mere presence might lead judges, prose-
cutors, and defense lawyers to practice the professionalism that should accom-
pany their role. 
However, as a long-term solution to the problem of racial bias, court 
watching will be ineffective. One reason is that once court watchers leave, 
courtroom actors might revert back to their problematic behaviors. Van Cleve 
shares an instance of exactly this. When she was clerking at the prosecutor’s 
office, a prosecutor cautioned her to be on her “best behavior” after noticing a 
court watcher sitting in the gallery.
127
 Then the judge and prosecutor “began to 
‘perform’ the normative professionalism that one would associate with their 
roles” until the court watcher left.
128
 Afterwards, they all burst out laughing.
129
 
Additionally, court watching might even stymie efforts at addressing bias at 
the structural level if people expect to witness overtly racist practices similar to 
the ones Van Cleve recounts.
130
 This is likely since she asks readers to 
“[r]eplicate my data until you change the findings in Cook County-Chicago 
and perhaps in other jurisdictions.”
131
 The problem is that court watchers may 
not encounter any of these racialized practices since judges, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers may behave differently in their presence, preventing the 
watchers from getting an accurate view of the system. Furthermore, many of 
Van Cleve’s examples did not occur in open court, but rather during plea nego-
tiations, in conversations with clients, or during interviews of courtroom ac-
tors. Such sources of information may not be available to the average court 
 
125. Id. 
126. See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Black Women, White Justice, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS 
AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH 209 (Austin Sarat & Marianne Con-
stable eds., 1998) (sharing stories of courtroom encounters that reveal how black women 
experience the justice system). 
127. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 44. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. She writes that court watching will allow people “to see racial degradation ceremonies per-
formed in the name of criminal justice.” Id. at 189. 
131. Id. 
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watcher. If people do not witness these practices, they may conclude that the 
system is no longer racially biased and that nothing more needs to be done to 
address racism in the criminal courts. However, as I argued in Part II, racial bi-
as exists even when it is not discernible. 
The problem of racial bias in the criminal justice system defies easy solu-
tions. The influence of race on decision making will be difficult to flush out ei-
ther because people may be unaware of the effect of implicit biases on their 
judgments or because they will hide their consciously racist beliefs. Further-
more, the enormous discretion wielded by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and 
judges facilitates racial bias, both conscious and implicit. The most effective so-
lution would be to rethink the criminal justice policies and policing practices 
that not only create the conditions for systemic triage but also sustain the nega-
tive association between people of color and crime. Nevertheless, until that day 
arrives, there are some interim solutions that can help to safeguard against the 
influence of implicit racial biases. These are discussed next. 
B. Individual, Institutional, and Systemic Solutions 
The conditions of systemic triage allow implicit racial biases to thrive. Im-
portantly, however, their effects are not inevitable. In this Section, I discuss 
some individual, institutional, and systemic mechanisms that together may 
help to reduce the influence of implicit biases on behaviors and judgments. 
At the individual level, two interventions have proven promising: aware-
ness of implicit bias
132
 and doubting one’s objectivity.
133
 Both of these interven-
tions work by encouraging people to exercise care when making judgments and 
by helping people understand that their judgments might be biased even if 
they are not consciously aware of it.
134
 These tools are especially likely to be 
successful when individuals are internally motivated to reduce biased judg-
 
132. Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in DUAL-
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 346 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trop eds., 1999); 
Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation To Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008); John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Sum-
mary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 56-57 
(2009); Devin G. Pope et al., Awareness Reduces Racial Bias (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper 19765, 2014) (on file with author). 
133. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of Self-
Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECI-
SION PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007). 
134. Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCI. 37, 39 (2007). 
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These interventions also highlight why the ideology of colorblindness is 
problematic. As Eduardo Bonilla-Silva argued in Racism Without Racists, at the 
heart of colorblind racism is the “myth” that “race has all but disappeared as a 
factor shaping the life chances of all Americans.”
136
 Furthermore, this ideology 
allows “whites [to] enunciate positions that safeguard their racial interests 
without sounding ‘racist.’”
137
 To the extent that courtroom actors engage in 
colorblindness, it will stymie efforts to reduce the effects of implicit racial bias 
on behaviors and judgments.
138
 In fact, in social science studies, colorblindness 
“has been shown to generate greater individual expressions of racial bias on 
both explicit and implicit measures.”
139
 
One practical method for increasing awareness and encouraging people to 
doubt their objectivity is through training. Across the country, state and federal 
public defenders, prosecutors, and judges are being trained on what implicit 
biases are and how they can influence the decision making of even the most 
egalitarian individuals.
140
 In fact, people who hold perspectives that are genu-
inely egalitarian can be the perpetrators of biased conduct based on implicit bi-
as, especially if holding these perspectives makes them less likely to question 
their objectivity. The Department of Justice recently made these trainings man-
datory for prosecutors and law enforcement officers.
141 
In addition to awareness and questioning objectivity, other individual in-
terventions such as slowing down decision making; engaging in mindful, de-
 
135. E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation To Respond Without 
Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 824-28 (1998). 
136. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 302 (2014). 
137. Id. at 4. 
138. Van Cleve highlights numerous instances of colorblindness amongst courtroom actors. See 
supra notes 27-33. 
139. Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, First, Do No Harm: On Addressing the Problem of 
Implicit Bias in Juror Decision Making, 49 COURT REV. 190, 193 (2013) (citing Jennifer A. 
Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindness on 
Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004)). 
140. I have conducted these trainings for police departments, federal and state prosecutors, and 
public defenders. 
141. Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Announces New Department-Wide Implicit  
Bias Training for Personnel, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 27, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/department-justice-announces-new-department-wide-implicit-bias-training-personnel 
[http://perma.cc/P3K2-JFF4]. 





 and gathering more information can pre-
vent reliance on implicit stereotypes and attitudes.
143
 The problem is that the 
pressure of systemic triage can make these interventions difficult to accom-
plish.
144
 However, engaging in triage is a choice, not a requirement. In fact, tri-
age in the criminal justice context arguably violates constitutional and profes-
sional mandates. Thus, prosecutors and defense lawyers should refuse to bow 
to the pressure to resolve cases hastily simply to deal with the realities of an 
overburdened system. 
Professor Jenny Roberts explains that defense lawyers could “refus[e] to 
process individuals quickly through the lower criminal courts” by “litigat[ing] 
some of the many factual and legal issues” raised by these cases.
145
 As for pros-
ecutors, they should live up to their special responsibilities as “ministers of jus-
tice,”
146
 which require them, among other things, “to see that the defendant is 
accorded procedural justice.”
147
 Judges, too, should similarly avoid pressuring 
defense counsel and prosecutors to rush through jury selection and trials. Some 
may object to these proposals because giving defendants the individualized jus-
tice and zealous advocacy to which they are entitled will lead to longer delays 
and may also raise speedy trial concerns. However, the answer cannot be to 
simply continue to short circuit justice in the name of expediency. If giving de-
fendants the process they are due leads the system to grind to a halt, then per-
haps this will put pressure on criminal justice system decision makers to re-
 
142. Bargh, supra note 78, at 28. 
143. Id. (“[I]t is possible to gain control [over automatic processes] by ‘making the hard choice’ 
and spending the additional cognitive effort to avoid pigeonholing or stereotyping an indi-
vidual. Instead, the person can effortfully seek out additional individuating information and 
integrate it into a coherent impression.” (citation omitted)); Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual 
Process Model of Impression Formation, in 1 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Thomas K. 
Scrull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr. eds., 1988); Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum 
of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Infor-
mation and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990). 
144. Sometimes there is good reason to attempt to resolve cases quickly. For instance, sometimes 
a defendant can get released from custody immediately or have his case dismissed instead of 
languishing in jail. 
145. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1131 (2013); 
Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice 
-system.html [http://perma.cc/A87K-7SWR]. 
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
147. Id. 
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think the policing practices and criminal justice policies that create the condi-
tions of systemic triage in the first place. 
None of these interventions will be easy to accomplish. However, once 
people are aware that there are steps they can take to address implicit biases, 
the failure to do so is as culpable as acting on the basis of conscious racial big-
otry.
148
 Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers should accept responsibility 
for taking steps to reduce the influence of implicit biases; otherwise they are 
complicit in continuing to sustain a racialized system. There is reason for opti-
mism that some courtroom actors will engage in these efforts. For instance, 
Federal District Court Judge Mark M. Bennett attempts to reduce the effects of 
implicit racial biases on his sentencing judgments by stripping photos and all 
racial indicators from his presentence reports.
149
 
While individual interventions are important, they must be accompanied 
by interventions at the institutional level in order to increase the chances of 
success. If this does not occur, it might be difficult for one individual to with-
stand the pressure to conform by speeding up case adjudications. For instance, 
Van Cleve relates how prosecutors and judges punished defense lawyers who 
attempted to engage in zealous advocacy.
150
 This is unsurprising given the 
symbiotic nature of systemic triage, where the resource allocation decisions of 
one actor influence the workload of the others. Thus, even if an individual pub-
lic defender decides to slow down in order to safeguard against the influence of 
implicit biases on decision making, the pressure and formal and informal pun-
ishments that the individual will suffer from judges and prosecutors because of 
his or her efforts may result in that individual succumbing to the pressure. 
The leaders of prosecutor and public defender offices can assist by making 
it clear that they will support the efforts of their line personnel to do what is 
necessary to ensure that they are living up to their ethical and constitutional 
obligations. This will help reduce the influence of implicit bias not only be-
cause it will give individuals the courage to resist the pressure to dispose of cas-
es quickly, but also because people are motivated to conform their beliefs to 
those of the people around them.
151
 Thus, institutions should clearly com-
 
148. One important caveat needs to be made here. My argument is not that moving swiftly 
through a case is always problematic. For instance, there are circumstances when defense 
counsel may want to quickly resolve a case because doing so will result in a better outcome 
for her client. Rather, I am simply making the point that rushing through cases solely to deal 
with the pressures of triage is problematic. 
149. This knowledge is based on conversations with Judge Bennett. 
150. See supra notes 54-58. 
151. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior 
and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 651 (2001). 
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municate that making efforts to reduce the influence of implicit biases is im-
portant and provide institutional backing for those efforts. This will make in-
dividuals more likely to accept the punishment they might face from other in-
stitutional actors for refusing to engage in triage decision making and help 
them fight the pressure to practice racialized justice. Institutional support can 
also facilitate the creation of a cohort of like-minded individuals, making it eas-
ier to maintain one’s commitment to do what is necessary to address implicit 
biases. 
Some institutions are already engaged in these efforts. For instance, San 
Francisco Public Defender Jeff Adachi has established safeguards in his office to 
reduce implicit biases’ pernicious effects. These safeguards include asking his 
attorneys to use checklists that require them to answer questions such as, “how 
would I handle this case different[ly] if my client was another race or had a 
different social background.”
152
 Additionally, one district attorney’s office in 
North Carolina has asked an implicit bias expert to embed herself in the office 
to help line prosecutors determine how to reduce the influence of implicit bias-
es on their discretionary decisions.
153
 Both of these examples send the message 
throughout the office that the institution believes these efforts are important, 
thereby helping to motivate individuals to conform their behaviors to meet this 
expectation. 
Finally, even if individuals and institutions make efforts to reduce the influ-
ence of implicit racial biases, the gold standard would be coordinated change 
among different arms of the criminal justice system—that is, the prosecutor’s 
office, the public defender’s office, and judges working together to address 
these biases. As I discussed in Part II, systemic triage attends to the interaction 
between criminal justice system institutions and the ways in which the resource 
allocation decisions of one influence the other. Thus, even if one institution en-
courages its personnel to engage in efforts to reduce implicit bias, the others 
might resist the increase in their workload that this might cause. 
All three institutions should instead work together to ensure that the goal 
of efficiency does not override the important values of fairness, equality, and 
protection of constitutional rights. They should encourage each other to prac-
tice normative professionalism and pressure each other to align their practices 
with their beliefs in due process, legal ethics, and other values that likely moti-
vated them to practice criminal law in the first place. If this occurred, it would 
 
152. Jeff Adachi, Public Defenders Can Be Biased, Too, and It Hurts Their Non-White Clients, WASH. 
POST (June 7, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/07
/public-defenders-can-be-biased-too-and-it-hurts-their-non-white-clients [http://perma.cc
/S98M-9CRG]. 
153. This information is based on my conversations with this implicit bias expert. 
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slow down the system to such an extent that policymakers would be forced to 
confront the problem of overburdened courts and insufficient resources. This 
might provoke changes to current criminal justice policies and policing practic-
es that not only create the conditions for systemic triage, but, by filling criminal 
courtrooms with individuals of color charged with nonviolent offenses, also 
help to strengthen the association linking black and brown individuals with 
crime and whites with innocence. 
While it might sound unrealistic to think that institutions could work to-
gether to reduce implicit racial bias, aspects of this are already occurring in Se-
attle, Washington. A group consisting of two federal district court judges, the 
U.S. Attorney and an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the Federal Public Defender, an 
ACLU director and an ACLU staff attorney, two civil lawyers, and a law profes-
sor are working together to develop jury instructions and a jury orientation 
video to help address the probable effects of implicit biases on jury decision 
making.
154
 The commitment of this diverse group to address the effects of im-
plicit racial bias provides reason for optimism that other courthouses across the 
country might engage in similar efforts. While the Seattle project is currently 
limited to jury decision making, it is possible that the awareness of implicit bias 
underlying this undertaking and the trust and relationships that have devel-
oped during the process will translate into a joint effort to reduce triage deci-
sion making in the courthouse. 
 
conclusion 
As this Review argues, racialized practices need not be overt, punitive, and 
extreme, and courtroom actors need not be consciously biased in order for race 
to have pernicious and disturbing consequences on behaviors and judgments. 
However, to the extent that people today are more likely to be consciously egal-
itarian than not, there is reason to hope that educating criminal justice actors 
about implicit racial biases and how systemic triage makes it more challenging 
to safeguard against the influence of these biases might help encourage actors 
to fight for institutional and structural changes. Changing the institutional and 
structural conditions that allow implicit biases to flourish is important because 
this “new” racism is, as Van Cleve concludes about colorblind racism, “just as 
punitive and abusive”
155 as old-fashioned bigotry. In fact, this new racism is in 
some ways more dangerous and pernicious than racial bigotry because it is 
ephemeral and difficult to eradicate. 
 
154. This is a project with which I am involved. 
155. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 186. 
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Van Cleve’s important ethnography brings to light the hidden and perni-
cious workings of the criminal justice system that often operates in the shad-
ows. Based on the model of systemic triage introduced in this Review, it is like-
ly that the racialized practices she exposes also exist in many other jurisdictions 
with overburdened courts, although these practices may not operate in a simi-
larly overt and explicit fashion. Even more troubling is the probability that 
these practices will thrive under conditions of systemic triage despite the exist-
ence of constitutional protections, a court record, and prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and judges who are ostensibly committed to lofty principles of justice 
and fairness. The problematic practices of racism without racists make a mock-
ery of justice that should trouble us all. 
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